Coalition logic is one of the most popular logics for multi-agent systems. While epistemic extensions of coalition logic have received much attention, existence of their complete axiomatisations has so far been an open problem. In this paper we settle several of those problems. We prove completeness for epistemic coalition logic with common knowledge, with distributed knowledge, and with both common and distributed knowledge, respectively.
Introduction
Logics of coalitional ability such as Coalition Logic (CL) [11] , Alternating-time Temporal Logic (AT L) [1] , and STiT logics [2] , are arguably some of the most studied logics in multi-agent systems in recent years. Many different variants of these logics have been proposed and studied, but so far meta-logical results have focused more on computational expressiveness and expressive power and less on completeness, with Goranko's and van Drimmelen's completeness proof for AT L [6], Pauly's completeness proof for CL [11] and Broersen and colleagues' completeness proofs for different variants of STiT logic [4, 3, 9] being notable exceptions.
The main construction in coalitional ability logics is of the form [G] φ, where G is a set of agents and φ a formula, intuitively meaning that G is effective for φ, or that G can make φ come true no matter what the other agents do. One of the most studied extension of basic coalitional ability logics is adding knowledge operators of the type found in epistemic logic [5, 10] : both individual knowledge operators K i where i is an agent, and different types of group knowledge operators E G , C G and D G where G is a group of agents, standing for everybody-knows, common knowledge and distributed knowledge, respectively. Combining coalitional ability operators and epistemic operators in general and group knowledge operators in particular lets us express many potentially interesting properties of multi-agent systems, such as [12] :
• C G φ → [G]ψ: common knowledge in G of φ is sufficient for G to ensure that ψ
• [G]ψ → D G φ: distributed knowledge in G of φ is necessary for G to ensure that ψ
• D G φ → [G]E G φ: G can cooperate to make distributed knowledge explicit
In this paper we study a complete axiomatisation of variants of epistemic coalition logic (ECL), extensions of coalition logic with individual knowledge and different combinations of common knowledge and distributed knowledge. Coalition logic, the next-time fragment of AT L, is one of the most studied coalitional ability logics, and this paper settles a key open problem: completeness of its epistemic variants.
While epistemic coalitional ability logics have been studied to a great extent, we are not aware of any published completeness results for such logics with all epistemic operators. [12] gives some axioms of AT EL, AT L extended with epistemic operators, but does not attempt to prove completeness 1 . Broersen and colleagues [3, 9] prove completeness of variants of STiT logic that include individual knowledge operators, but not group knowledge operators, and [9] concludes that adding group operators is an important challenge.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we first give a brief review of coalition logic, and how it is extended with epistemic operators. We then, in each of the three following sections, consider basic epistemic coalition logic with individual knowledge operators extended with common knowledge, with distributed knowledge, and with both common and distributed knowledge, respectively. For each of these cases we show a completeness result. For the common knowledge case we also show a filtration result. We conclude in Section 6.
Background
We define several extensions of propositional logic, and the usual derived connectives, such as φ → ψ for ¬φ ∧ ψ, will be used.
Coalition Logic
Assume a set Θ of atomic propositions, and a finite set N of agents. A coalition is a set G ⊆ N of agents. We sometimes abuse notation and write a singleton coalition {i} as i.
The language of coalition logic (CL) is defined by the following grammar:
where p ∈ Θ and G ⊆ N .
A coalition model is a tuple
• S is a non-empty set of states;
• V is a valuation function, assigning a set V (s) ⊆ Θ to each state s ∈ S;
• E assigns a truly playable effectivity function E(s) to each state s ∈ S.
An effectivity function [11] over N and a set of states S is a function E that maps any coalition G ⊆ N to a set of sets of states E(G) ⊆ 2 S . An effectivity function is truly playable [11, 8] iff it satisfies the following conditions:
is the non-monotonic core of the empty coalition, namely
An effectivity function that only satisfies E1-E5 is called playable. On finite domains an effectivity function is playable iff it is truly playable [8] , because on finite domains E6 follows from E1-E5. An CL formula is interpreted in a state in a coalition model as follows:
where φ M = {t ∈ S : M, t |= φ}. Figure 1 shows an axiomatisation CL of coalition logic which is sound and complete wrt. all coalition models [11] . The following monotonicity rule is derivable, and will be useful later: 
Adding Knowledge Operators
Epistemic extensions of coalition logic were first proposed in [12] 2 . They are obtained by extending the language with epistemic operators, and the models with epistemic accessibility relations.
An epistemic accessibility relation for agent i over a set of states S is a binary relation ∼ i ⊆ S × S. We will assume that epistemic accessibility relations are equivalence relations. An epistemic coalition model, henceforth often called simply a model, is a tuple
where S, E, V is a coalition model and ∼ i is an epistemic accessibility relation over S for each agent i.
Epistemic operators come in two types: individual knowledge operators K i , where i is an agent, and group knowledge operators C G and D G where G is a coalition for expressing common knowledge and distributed knowledge, respectively. Formally, the language of CLCD (coalition logic with common and distributed knowledge), is defined by extending coalition logic with all of these operators:
The languages of the logics CLK, CLC and CLD are the restrictions of this language with no C G and no D G operators, no D G operators, and no C G operators, respectively.
The interpretation of these languages in an (epistemic coalition) model M is defined by adding the following clauses to the definition for CL:
where R * denotes the transitive closure of the relation R. We use |= φ to denote the fact that φ is valid, i.e., that M, s |= φ for all M and states s in M .
Some Auxiliary Definitions
The following are some auxiliary concepts that will be useful in the following.
A pseudomodel is a tuple M = (S,
is a model and:
The interpretation of a CLCD formula in a state of a pseudomodel is defined as for a model, except for the case for D G which is interpreted by the R G relation:
An epistemic model is a model without the E function, i.e., a tuple S, ∼ 1 , . . . , ∼ n , V . An epistemic pseudomodel is a pseudomodel without the E function, i.e., a tuple S,
Finally, a playable (pseudo)model is a (pseudo)model where only conditions E1-E5 on E hold.
Coalition Logic with Common Knowledge
In this section we consider the logic CLC, extending coalition logic with individual knowledge operators and common knowledge. We first prove a completeness result, and then show that CLC admits filtrations.
Completeness
The axiomatisation CLC is shown in Figure 2 . It extends CL with standard axioms and rules for individual and common knowledge (see, e.g., [5] ).
It is easy to show that CLC is sound wrt. all models.
Lemma 1 (Soundness) For any CLC-formula φ, CLC φ ⇒|= φ.
In the remainder of this section we show that CLC also is complete.
Theorem 1 Any CLC-consistent formula is satisfied in some model. Proof We define a canonical playable model
S c is the set of all maximally CLC consistent sets of formulas
The conditions on ∼ c i (that it is an equivalence relation) and on E c (that it satisfies E1-E5) hold in M c . The proof for ∼ c i is obvious and the proof for E c is standard. The intuition of cause is that a formula belongs to a state s in a model iff it is true there (truth lemma). However, the canonical model is in general not guaranteed to satisfy every consistent formula in the CLC language; the case of C G in the truth lemma does not necessarily hold. Therefore we are going to transform M c by filtration into a finite model for a given CLC consistent formula φ. Note that since φ is consistent, it will belong to at least
We will omit the subscript cl(φ) in what follows for readability.
. Again we will omit the subscript for readability.
We now prove by induction on the size of θ that for every 
) is consistent, but since K i is an S5 modality, this is impossible. Same for the case when
Proof of (*): assume
is provably equivalent to
which in turn is provably equivalent to
which in turn is equivalent to ψ∧ hence to ψ. So in M c , {s
Proof of (**): since we defined X ∈ E c (N )(s) to hold iff S c \X ∈ E c (∅)(s), it suffices to show the case that G = N . The direction to the left is immediate: if [G]ψ ∈ s then {s ∈ S c : ψ ∈ s } ∈ E c (G)(s) by definition. For the other direction assume that {s ∈ S c : ψ ∈ s } ∈ E c (G)(s), i.e., there is some γ such that {s ∈ S c : γ ∈ s } ⊆ {s ∈ S c : ψ ∈ s } and [G]γ ∈ s. It is easy to see that {s ∈ S c : γ ∈ s } ⊆ {s ∈ S c : ψ ∈ s } implies that γ → ψ, and by the monotonicity rule it follows that [G]ψ ∈ s.
case θ = C G ψ The proof is similar to [13] . First we show that in Similarly to [13] it can be proved that CLC φ [s] → χ, CLC χ → ψ and
It is obvious that in M f , ∼ i are equivalence relations. So what remains to be proved is that E f satisfies E1-E6. Since S f is finite, it suffices to show E1-E5, which for finite sets of states entail E6.
Proof E1 Note that φ ∅ is an empty disjunction, namely ⊥.
Then {s : φX ∈ s } ∈ E c (∅)(s). Note that {s : φX ∈ s } is the complement of {s : φ X ∈ s }, since φX = ¬φ X . Since E c satisfies E3, this means that {s :
which is in turn the same as
Completeness of Coalition Logic with Distributed Knowledge
In this section we consider the logic CLD, extending coalition logic with individual knowledge operators and distributed knowledge. The axiomatisation CLD is shown in Figure 3 . It extends CL with standard axioms and rules for individual and distributed knowledge (see, e.g., [5] ).
As usual, soundness can easily be shown.
Lemma 2 (Soundness) For any CLD-formula φ, CLD φ ⇒|= φ.
In the remainder of this section we show that CLD also is complete. For a set of formulae s, let
for CLD is defined as follows:
• S c is the set of maximal consistent sets.
•
Proof The proof is by induction on φ. The epistemic cases are exactly as for standard normal modal logic. The case for coalition operators is exactly as in [11] . J Theorem 3 If a formula is satisfied in a finite pseudomodel, then it is satisfied in a model.
be the epistemic pseudomodel underlying M , and let M p = (S , {∼ i : i ∈ N }, V ) and f : S → S be as in Theorem 2. Let image(X) = {s : f (s ) ∈ X} for any set X ⊆ S. Finally, let M = (S , {∼ i : i ∈ N }, E , V ) where E is defined as follows:
Two things must be shown: that M is a proper model, and that it satisfies φ.
Since M p is an epistemic model, to show that M is a model all that remains to be shown is that E is truly playable. We now show that that follows from true playability of E.
) which is impossible since M satisfies E1. Note that in particular this proves ∅ ∈ E (∅)(u).
For N , ∅ ∈ E (N )(u) iff S ∈ E (∅)(u) and we'll see that this is impossible below.
E2 Note that image(S) = S .
For G = N , S ∈ E (G)(u) iff (by definition of E ) ∃X ⊆ S, (S ⊇ image(X)and X ∈ E(G)(f (u))) and since S ⊇ image(S) and S ∈ E(G)(f (u)), S ∈ E (G)(u) holds. Note that in particular this proves S ∈ E (∅)(u).
For N , S ∈ E (N )(u) iff ∅ ∈ E (∅)(u) and this was proved above.
E4 E is monotonic by definition for G = N .
For N , assume X ⊆ Y and X ∈ E (N )(u). ThenX ∈ E (∅)(u). Since for ∅ we already have monotonicity andȲ ⊆X,Ȳ ∈ E (∅)(u). So Y ∈ E (N )(u).
The axiomatisation CLCD is shown in Figure 4 . It extends CL with standard axioms and rules for individual, common and distributed knowledge.
Lemma 5 (Soundness) For any CLCD-formula φ, CLCD φ ⇒|= φ.
In the remainder of this section we show that CLCD also is complete.
Theorem 4 Any CLCD-consistent formula is satisfied in a finite pseudomodel.
Proof The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 4, with the addition of the inductive clause θ = C G ψ as in the proof of Theorem 1. J
We can now use the same approach as in the case of CLD.
Theorem 5 If a CLCD formula is satisfied in a finite pseudomodel, it is satisfied in a model.
Proof
The proof goes exactly like the proof of Theorem 3, using Theorem 2.
The definition of the model M is identical to the definition in Theorem 3, as is the proof that it is a proper model. For the last part of the proof, i.e., showing that M satisfies φ, note that the last clause in Theorem 2 holds for epistemic logic with both distributed and common knowledge. Thus, the proof is completed by only adding the inductive clause for [G]φ, which is done in exactly the same way as in Theorem 3. J Corollary 3 For any CLCD-formula φ, CLCD φ iff |= φ.
Conclusions
This papers solves several hitherto open problems, namely proving completeness of Coalition Logic extended with group knowledge modalities. The axioms for the epistemic modalities are the same as in the absence of the Coalition Logic axioms, however the completeness proofs require non-trivial combinations of techniques. The next step would be to look at complete axiomatisations of logics resulting from imposing some conditions on the interaction of coalitional ability and group knowledge (such as the examples in the Introduction), and obtaining results on the complexity of satisfiability problem for CLC, CLD and CLCD.
Prop Classical propositional logic Prop Classical propositional logic Figure 4 : CLCD: axiomatisation of CLCD.
